

Political Conflict in the 2024 Election: A Study Between Conceptualization, Typology, Accelerator, and Management

Ahward Anding

PPKn Study Program, Postgraduate, Gorontalo State University, Indonesia

*Corresponding Author: andingahwad@gmail.com

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Abstract : The 2024 election is one of the most complex electoral contests in the history of Indonesian democracy because it involves the simultaneous election of the president and vice president and legislative members. This complexity has the potential to give rise to political conflicts in various forms and levels of escalation. This study aims to analyze political conflicts in the 2024 election through four main aspects, namely conceptualization, typology, accelerators, and conflict management. The research uses a literature review method by examining relevant scientific articles, books, and legal documents published in the 2019–2026 period. The data was analyzed thematically to identify patterns, sources, driving factors, and mechanisms for managing political conflicts in electoral contestation. The results of the study show that political conflicts in the 2024 election can be understood as a consequence of contesting interests and fighting for political legitimacy that take place at the societal and institutional levels. Typologically, conflicts are divided into horizontal conflicts between voters and supporters, vertical conflicts between election participants and organizers, and structural conflicts related to regulations and institutional design. Identity politics, money politics, patronage, digital disinformation, and buzzer mobilization are accelerators that strengthen conflict escalation. Conflict management is carried out through mechanisms of supervision, resolving violations, adjudicating disputes, and resolving disputes over election results through institutions such as Bawaslu and the Constitutional Court. This study emphasizes that political conflicts are not always destructive, but can be a functional part of democracy if managed through credible institutions, law enforcement, and civic maturity. Strengthening political literacy and civic education is needed to encourage democratic conflict management and transform electoral conflicts into constructive political participation.

Keywords : Political Conflict; 2024 Elections; Conceptualization; Typology; Conflict Accelerator; Management

INTRODUCTION

General elections (elections) are one of the fundamental instruments in the democratic system that function as a means of peaceful

circulation of power and the legitimacy of people's sovereignty. Through elections, citizens channel their political preferences to determine the direction of leadership and

public policy (Surbakti, 2010). However, as an arena for power contestation, elections cannot be separated from potential conflicts. The struggle for limited political resources, clashes of interests between actors, and differences in ideological orientations make conflict an inherent phenomenon in every election (Budiardjo, 2008).

The 2024 simultaneous general elections in Indonesia occupy a special position in the history of national electoral democracy. For the first time, the presidential and vice presidential elections, the election of legislative members (DPR, DPD, and DPRD), and the election of regional heads (pilkada) were held in the same fiscal year. The extremely high complexity of this implementation not only demands the technical and administrative readiness of the organizers, but also increases the space and intensity of political conflicts at various levels. The multiplied burden of organizing puts pressure on the integrity of the process, opens loopholes for procedural violations, and triggers an escalation of tensions between political actors (Readiness of the Constitutional Court in Dispute Resolution, 2022).

Political conflicts in this context need to be understood comprehensively. Conflict does not always have a negative or destructive meaning. From the perspective of functional conflict theory, conflict can act as a safety valve that channels social tensions and even strengthens group cohesion if managed through appropriate institutional mechanisms (Coser,

1956). On the other hand, unmanaged conflicts have the potential to develop into violence, delegitimization of election results, and social disintegration. Therefore, the analysis of political conflicts in the 2024 elections has high theoretical and practical relevance.

Empirical reality shows that the 2024 election is colored by various forms of conflict. In the horizontal dimension, the strengthening of identity politics and the polarization of society are significant sources of tension, especially because the residue of polarization of the 2019 election has not completely subsided (The Impact of Identity Politics in the 2024, 2023 General Elections). In the vertical dimension, various allegations of fraud, administrative violations, and disagreements over results have emerged that have led to lawsuits to the Constitutional Court (Presidential Election Fraud in Indonesia in 2024, 2025). Meanwhile, in the structural dimension, a number of regulatory and institutional design issues have also increased the potential for conflict (Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders in the Implementation of the 2024, 2023 General Elections).

In addition, the practice of money politics, patronage, and clientelism that is still rampant, as well as the rise of disinformation and buzzer mobilization on social media, complicate the dynamics of the conflict that occurs (Taqiyuddin, 2024). These phenomena show that political conflicts in the 2024 election are multidimensional and cannot be reduced to a single factor. A study that is able to

systematically map the various sources, typologies, and mechanisms for managing these conflicts is needed.

A number of previous studies have discussed certain aspects of the 2024 election conflict, such as non-electoral factors triggering conflicts, identity politics, money politics, and dispute resolution. However, these studies tend to be partial and spread across different disciplines. There have not been many studies that integratively integrate these findings into a complete political conflict analysis framework. This gap (research gap) is to be answered through this research.

The urgency of this study also lies in the character of the 2024 election as a political event that takes place in the midst of a national leadership transition. The contest to fill the presidential position that is no longer followed by the incumbent creates a very tight open competition, while at the same time there is also a consolidation of political power at the regional level through simultaneous regional elections. This situation puts various political actors in a multi-layered competition that increases the possibility of conflicts of interest. This kind of dynamic demands an analysis that does not only stop at surface symptoms, but also uncovers the structures underlying the birth of conflicts.

The study of political conflicts in the 2024 election has significance in the framework of civic education (PPKn). As a discipline that aims to form intelligent and civilized citizens, PPKn is directly interested in how political conflicts are understood, managed, and

transformed into constructive energy for democracy. An adequate understanding of the anatomy of electoral conflicts is an important material for the development of political education and democracy education teaching materials that are relevant to the current context.

Based on this background, this study aims to: (1) identify the conceptualization of political conflicts in electoral contestation; (2) map the typology and sources of political conflicts in the 2024 elections; (3) analyze conflict accelerator factors such as identity politics, money politics, and digital disinformation; (4) examine the role of conflict resolution institutions in mitigating escalation; and (5) formulate implications for strengthening civic education in democratic conflict management. Through this literature review, it is hoped that a more holistic understanding of the anatomy of political conflicts in the 2024 election will be obtained as a reflection material for improving the quality of Indonesian democracy in the future.

METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach with the library research method which is a systematic literature review. This method was chosen because the purpose of the research is to analyze, synthesize, and map existing knowledge about political conflicts in the 2024 elections, not to collect primary data in the field. Literature studies are a critical research method that places library materials as

the main source of data to be systematically analyzed and synthesized (Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders in the Implementation of the 2024, 2023 General Elections).

The data sources in this study are in the form of secondary data consisting of articles from accredited scientific journals, proceedings, textbooks, reports of election organizing institutions, and relevant laws and regulations. Literature searches were conducted through academic databases such as Google Scholar, Garuda (Garba Reference Digital), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), and SINTA-indexed journal portals. The keywords used in the search included 'political conflict', '2024 elections', 'identity politics', 'money politics', 'polarization', 'election disputes', and 'election conflict resolution', both in Indonesian and English.

The publication time range is 2019 to 2026, with the consideration that the period includes the dynamics before, during, and after the 2024 elections, including the polarization residue of the 2019 elections. To ensure the relevance and quality of sources, inclusion and exclusion criteria are established. Inclusion criteria include: (1) publications discussing conflicts, violations, disputes, or political dynamics in elections in Indonesia; (2) available in full text; and (3) published in credible scientific journals, books, or institutions. Exclusion criteria include publications that are not relevant to the Indonesian electoral context as well as sources whose credibility cannot be verified.

In addition to the contemporary literature on the 2024 elections, this study also uses classical theoretical works as a conceptual foundation, especially the conflict theory of Lewis Coser (1956) and Ralf Dahrendorf (1959), as well as the theory of political culture from Almond and Verba (1963). This theoretical foundation is used to frame the analysis so that empirical findings from various literature can be read conceptually.

Data analysis is carried out using content analysis and thematic analysis. The analysis procedure includes three interrelated stages. First, data reduction, which is the selection and organization of literature based on relevance to the research question. Second, data presentation, which is the grouping of findings into main themes such as conflict typology, trigger factors, and resolution mechanisms. Third, conclusion drawing and verification, which is the formulation of synthesis of various findings to answer the research objectives. To maintain validity, source triangulation is carried out by comparing findings from various literature to obtain credible and scientifically accountable conclusions.

The coding process is carried out in stages by identifying key words and main ideas in each literature, then grouping them into thematic categories. The categories formed are then synthesized to produce patterns and relationships between themes. This approach allows researchers not only to describe individual findings from each source, but also to

build a complete analytical narrative about the political conflicts of the 2024 elections. Thus, the results of the study are integrative and not just a summary of the literature that stands alone.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Conceptualization of Political Conflict in Electoral Contestation

Political conflict can conceptually be understood as a form of conflict that arises due to differences in interests, values, or goals between actors in the struggle for limited power resources. From the perspective of political sociology, conflict is a natural and even inevitable symptom in every society that has a power structure. Dahrendorf (1959) views conflict as a consequence of the unequal distribution of authority in society, where the powerful and the controlled groups have conflicting interests. Elections, as a mechanism for redistributing political authority, are themselves a conflict-ridden arena.

Coser (1956) offers a more nuanced perspective through the concept of functional conflict. According to him, conflict does not always have a negative impact; under certain conditions, conflict can actually strengthen internal group solidarity, clarify identity boundaries, and encourage the formation of better norms and settlement mechanisms. Conflict becomes destructive only when it attacks the basic values (basic consensus) that are the foundation of the sustainability of a society. In the context of elections, conflicts managed through the contestation of agreed

ideas and rules of the game can strengthen democracy, while conflicts that come out of institutional corridors can threaten the legitimacy of the system.

Both classical perspectives are relevant to read elections as institutions deliberately designed to manage conflicts. Instead of eliminating conflict, elections institutionalize power competition into mutually agreed rules of the game. Thus, elections can be seen as a mechanism for transitioning conflicts from a potentially violent form to an orderly and measurable contest. The success of this institutionalization is an important measure of the maturity of a nation's democracy.

In Indonesia's electoral framework, political conflicts can be distinguished based on the actors and the direction of their relationships. Conflicts can occur horizontally, namely between citizens or between supporters of candidates; vertically, namely between election participants and organizers or the state; or structurally, namely conflicts that originate from institutional and regulatory designs. These three forms do not stand alone, but are intertwined and can trigger each other (Potential Conflicts Impacts of Holding Simultaneous Elections 2024, 2023).

Furthermore, political conflicts in elections can be analyzed through both structural approaches and actors' approaches. The structural approach views conflict as a consequence of social, economic, and institutional conditions that create inequality and conflicts of interest. In contrast, the actor's

approach emphasizes the role of individuals and groups that deliberately produce conflicts for political gain. In the reality of the 2024 elections, these two approaches are complementary: conflict is born from a vulnerable structure as well as from the actions of actors who exploit these vulnerabilities (Surbakti, 2010).

This conceptual understanding is important as a foothold for analysis, because it helps distinguish between conflicts that are productive for democracy and conflicts that are destructive. The quality of democracy is not measured by the absence of conflict, but by the capacity of the political system to manage conflicts peacefully and institutionally. Thus, the analysis of the 2024 election conflict not only takes inventory of conflict events, but also assesses the extent to which institutional mechanisms are able to mitigate their escalation. This theoretical framework is the lens for reading various empirical findings synthesized in the following sections.

2. Typology and Sources of Political Conflict in the 2024 Election

Based on the synthesis of the literature, political conflicts in the 2024 election can be mapped into three main interrelated typologies, namely horizontal conflicts, vertical conflicts, and structural conflicts. This mapping helps to understand that conflicts do not arise from a single source, but from the accumulation of various electoral and non-electoral factors. This typology is analytical and is not intended as a rigidly separate category, considering that in

practice the three are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing each other.

a. Horizontal Conflict Between Citizens and Supporters

Horizontal conflict is a conflict that occurs between fellow citizens or between groups supporting a candidate. This form of conflict is most visible and has the potential to cause direct social friction. The main triggers are the strengthening of primordial sentiments, fanaticism of support, and differences in political choices that are emotionally framed. Ahead of and during the 2024 election, tensions between supporters are often seen both in physical public spaces and in digital spaces. The polarization residue from the 2019 election that has not fully recovered increases people's vulnerability to horizontal conflicts (Efforts to Prevent Political Polarization in the 2024 Election Year, 2023).

This horizontal conflict is exacerbated by socio-cultural and economic factors. People with low levels of political literacy tend to be more easily mobilized by emotional issues and more vulnerable to provocation. In the local context, kinship networks and patron-client relationships also form a dividing line (cleavage) that can trigger tensions between groups (Taqiyuddin, 2024).

Concrete forms of horizontal conflicts vary, ranging from arguments wars in the digital space, destruction of campaign attributes, friction between sympathizers during campaigns, to social tensions after the results are determined. Although most horizontal

conflicts in the 2024 election do not develop into large-scale violence, the accumulation of unmanaged tensions can leave a residue of distrust between citizens. This residue is dangerous because it can carry over into the next election cycle and gradually harden social divisions.

b. Vertical Conflict between Participants and Organizers

Vertical conflict is a conflict between election participants and state organizers or authorities. This conflict generally stems from allegations of fraud, administrative violations, non-neutrality of organizers, and disputes over election results. In the 2024 election, a number of problems have emerged, ranging from alleged procedural violations by organizers, ballot logistics issues, to allegations of structured, systematic, and massive fraud (TSM) (Presidential Election Fraud in Indonesia in 2024, 2025).

Distrust in the neutrality of the organizers is one of the sources of serious vertical conflicts. When participants or the public perceive that the election process does not take place honestly and fairly, the legitimacy of the election results will be eroded. This vertical conflict is then channeled through formal channels, namely submitting disputes to the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) and disputes over the results to the Constitutional Court (MK). The existence of this institutional channel is important so that vertical conflicts do not develop into open conflicts on the streets

(Bawaslu's Roles and Challenges in Resolving Disputes in the Election Process in 2024, 2025).

Vertical conflict has a distinctive character because it involves the asymmetry of power between citizens or election participants and the state as the holder of the organizing authority. Therefore, vertical conflict resolution is highly dependent on the availability of impartial institutions and legal mechanisms that can be accessed equally by all parties. If these formal channels are perceived as closed or partial, vertical conflicts have the potential to transform into horizontal conflicts when citizens lose trust in institutions and choose to channel their disappointment through collective action.

c. Structural and Regulatory Conflicts

Structural conflicts originate from the institutional design and regulatory framework for the implementation of the election itself. In the 2024 elections, the simultaneity of five types of elections in one period creates an extraordinarily large workload for organizers, while opening up space for legal ambiguity and overlapping interests between institutions. Conflicts of interest between stakeholders, including coalitions of political parties, community organizations, and judicial institutions, also color this structural dynamic (Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders in the Implementation of the 2024, 2023 General Elections).

The very heavy burden of implementation also has implications for the humanitarian aspect of organizers in the field.

Administrative complexity, time pressure, and high volume of work can reduce the quality of implementation while increasing the chance of errors that lead to disputes. In other words, structural conflicts are not only abstract at the regulatory level, but also manifest in daily organizing practices that burden the apparatus at the lowest level.

In addition, non-electoral factors such as social, economic, cultural, religious, and legal dynamics also potentially trigger the escalation of conflict in the 2024 elections. These factors work at a structural level because they are related to the condition of society and the political system as a whole, not just momentary electoral events (Analysis of Non-Electoral Factors Potential to Trigger Election Conflicts in 2024, 2023). The issue of filling acting regional heads to fill vacancies due to simultaneity is also an example of structural conflict born from the design of simultaneous election regulations (Potential Conflicts Impact of Holding Simultaneous Elections in 2024, 2023).

d. Manifestation of Conflict at the Local Level

The typology of conflict above does not only take place at the national level, but also manifests typically at the local level. In the election arena, conflicts tend to be more personal and based on social relations because candidates and voters are often in the same kinship and community network. This geographical and social proximity makes local electoral conflicts have the potential to have a direct impact on the harmony of daily

community life, in contrast to conflicts at the national level which are more discursive.

In the local context, structural conflicts often arise in the form of disputes over the legitimacy of candidacy, administrative disputes, and disputes over results that lead to Re-Voting (PSU). This dynamic shows that the root of electoral conflicts is not only at the center of power, but is also embedded in social and political structures at the grassroots level. Therefore, the analysis of the 2024 election conflict needs to pay attention to the relationship between national and local dynamics simultaneously.

3. Identity Politics and Polarization as the Root of Conflict

One of the most prominent roots of political conflict in the 2024 election is identity politics. Identity politics refers to a political strategy that mobilizes support by exploiting group sentiments based on ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group (SARA). This phenomenon is not new in Indonesian politics, but tends to strengthen in electoral momentum because it is effective in quickly rallying group solidarity (The Impact of Identity Politics in the 2024, 2023 General Elections).

Identity politics becomes problematic when it is constructed by political elites as an instrument to create divisions, foster hatred, and corner political opponents. The resulting 'us versus them' narrative not only affects political choices, but also undermines social cohesion and normalizes hostility between citizens. The mental condition of the community

that is still influenced by primordialism and sectarianism sentiments makes it easy for identity politics to find fertile ground (Challenges and Efforts to Handle Identity Politics in the 2024, 2023 Elections).

Identity politics is closely intertwined with the phenomenon of political polarization. Polarization is the process of grouping people into camps that face each other sharply, accompanied by reduced space for dialogue and compromise. When polarization hardens, differences in political choices are no longer seen as a reasonable variation of preferences in democracy, but as an existential antagonism. This is what makes polarization a fertile ground for the growth of horizontal conflicts (Efforts to Prevent Political Polarization in the 2024, 2023 Election Year).

It should be emphasized that not all identity mobilizations are destructive. Group identity can be the basis for solidarity and legitimate political representation in a democracy. Problems arise when identity is exploited to delegitimize others and close the room for compromise. Thus, what needs to be managed is not the existence of identity itself, but the way identity is politicized. Failure to distinguish between the two often makes the response to identity politics untargeted.

Interestingly, a number of observations show that in the 2024 election, the intensity of religion-based identity politics has relatively decreased compared to the 2019 election, although it has not completely disappeared and shifted its form. This shift indicates a

democratic learning process, as well as a reminder that polarization can change from religious issues to other issues such as political dynasties and power patronage. This phenomenon reinforces the importance of continuous vigilance against all forms of identity politicization.

Within the framework of conflict theory, hardened polarization indicates that the conflict has shifted from the functional realm to the destructive realm, as it begins to threaten the basic national consensus. Therefore, the management of identity politics and polarization is an important prerequisite for keeping electoral conflicts within a healthy democratic corridor.

4. Money Politics, Patronage, and Clientelism

Another dimension that is inseparable from the political conflict in the 2024 election is the rise of money politics, patronage, and clientelism. Money politics refers to the practice of giving material rewards to voters to influence their political choices, which commonly appears in the form of dawn attacks or paid mass mobilization (Taqiyuddin, 2024). This practice has become a key element of electoral mobilization in many third-wave democracies, including Indonesia.

Muhtadi (2013) explained that the rise of money politics cannot be reduced solely to patron-client relations, but also related to the low party-ID at the mass level. When the ideological bond between voters and parties is weak, material transactions become a bridge

that fills the void. Aspinall and Berenschot (2019) even describe Indonesian democracy as an arena where votes can be 'traded' through a network of intermediaries (brokers) that connect candidates with voters. Classical studies on patronage and clientelism in legislative elections show that this practice takes place from a large scale to the smallest community realm (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015).

The relationship between money politics and conflict lies in two aspects. First, money politics creates unfair competition and triggers jealousy and accusations of fraud between candidates, thus becoming a source of vertical and horizontal conflicts. Second, money politics degrades the quality of participation to mere transactions, thereby weakening the legitimacy of election results. Various studies have confirmed that the eradication of money politics requires the active role of Bawaslu to the village level and the strengthening of firm law enforcement (Solutions to Money Politics for Simultaneous Elections in 2024, 2023).

The driving factors for the rise of money politics are multidimensional, including the issue of candidate credibility, low levels of political education, economic pressure on the community, and a culture that tolerates giving ahead of elections. The complexity of this factor explains why money politics is difficult to eradicate only through a legal approach. It is also necessary to transform the political culture of the community so that votes are no longer seen as a commodity that can be exchanged for momentary material rewards.

The practice of patronage also does not stop at the moment of giving before the vote, but often continues to be a binding reciprocal relationship after the election. When an elected candidate feels indebted to a network of intermediaries and funders, public policy has the potential to be distorted to serve the interests of certain groups rather than the public interest. This distortion shows that money politics is not just a matter of electoral integrity, but also a broader issue of governance.

Thus, money politics is not just an administrative violation, but a structural root that weakens the foundations of democracy and magnifies the potential for conflict. As long as these transactional relations are maintained, electoral conflicts will be difficult to avoid as contestation shifts from ideological contests to capital contests.

5. Social Media, Disinformation, and Buzzer Mobilization

Digital transformation has fundamentally changed the landscape of political contestation. In the 2024 election, social media will become the main battleground in the fight for public opinion. On the one hand, social media expands the space for participation and access to political information; on the other hand, it becomes a channel for the spread of disinformation, hate speech, and fake news (hoaxes) that effectively trigger conflicts (Presidential Election Fraud in Indonesia in 2024, 2025).

The phenomenon of buzzer mobilization increases the destructive power of disinformation. Buzzers work in an organized manner to form opinions, drive narratives, and attack political opponents through accounts that are often anonymous. This activity creates the illusion of majority support (bandwagon effect) while sharpening polarization. The echo chamber formed by social media algorithms makes users only exposed to information that strengthens their own beliefs, thus narrowing the space for dialogue and hardening divisions.

The fast-paced and viral nature of social media makes conflicts escalate much faster than in the pre-internet era. A provocative upload can spread to millions of users in a matter of hours, triggering a chain reaction that is difficult to control. This speed is not matched by the speed of verification, so false information is often believed to be the truth before it has time to be clarified. This condition puts people in a vulnerable position to manipulate opinions.

In addition to its negative impacts, social media also holds positive potential for democracy. The digital space can be a means of participatory supervision, reporting of violations, and political education that reaches a wide audience. A number of civil society movements use social media to guard the integrity of elections and spread electoral literacy. Thus, social media is not a single factor that is deterministic, but an arena whose use is highly determined by the literacy and ethics of its users.

Within the framework of conflict analysis, social media doubles as an accelerator as well as an amplifier of conflict. Fast-spreading disinformation can trigger horizontal tensions in a short period of time, while attacks on the credibility of organizers can magnify vertical conflicts. Therefore, digital space governance, people's digital literacy, and social media ethical enforcement are important components in contemporary electoral conflict management.

6. Dispute Results and the Role of Conflict Resolution Institutions

A crucial aspect in the analysis of political conflicts is the mechanism for resolving them. Electoral conflicts that are not channeled through institutional channels have the potential to develop into open conflicts. In the Indonesian election legal system, there are two main institutions that play a role in resolving conflicts, namely the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) and the Constitutional Court (MK).

Bawaslu has the authority to handle administrative violations and resolve disputes in the election process through mediation and adjudication mechanisms. Based on Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, Bawaslu and its staff are obliged to resolve process disputes within a predetermined deadline. This fast, efficient, and cost-free settlement process reflects the principle of checks and balances in constitutional democracy. However, Bawaslu faces challenges in the form of increasing

volume of disputes, double interpretations of legal norms, technical obstacles, and limited human resources in the implementation of the 2024 Election (Bawaslu's Role and Challenges in Dispute Resolution of the Election Process in 2024, 2025).

Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court has the authority to decide disputes over general election results (PHPU) that are final and binding (Nainggolan et al., 2025). In the 2024 election, the Constitutional Court is faced with a huge burden of cases with tight deadlines, thus demanding high institutional readiness both in terms of human resources and technological support. In response, the Constitutional Court implemented various strategies such as the division of judges in panels, the use of electronic courts (e-courts), and coordination with the KPU and Bawaslu in data verification (Hendrik et al., 2026). However, there is an academic debate regarding the limits of the Constitutional Court's authority, especially regarding process disputes that are TSM (Dispute Resolution Problems for the 2024, 2025 Presidential Election Process).

The effectiveness of conflict resolution institutions is highly dependent on public trust in their independence and impartiality. When the decisions of Bawaslu and the Constitutional Court are widely accepted as fair decisions, conflicts can subside and the legitimacy of election results is maintained. On the other hand, if the decisions of the resolution institutions are perceived to be loaded with political interests, conflicts can continue in the

form of prolonged dissatisfaction. Therefore, strengthening institutional integrity is the key to the effectiveness of the conflict resolution function in the electoral system.

In addition to formal-judicial channels, electoral conflict resolution also requires a non-judicial approach that is preventive and participatory. Conflict prevention efforts through participatory supervision, inter-stakeholder dialogue, voter education, and the declaration of peaceful elections have an important role in mitigating potential conflicts before they escalate. This combination of a repressive-judicial approach and a preventive-participatory approach forms a comprehensive electoral conflict management system.

One of the important corrective instruments born from the dispute resolution process is the Re-Voting (PSU). The PSU is a mechanism to correct procedural defects that affect the outcome of the election while maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of the democratic process. The existence of these conflict resolution institutions and instruments confirms that Indonesian democracy has an institutional channel to transform conflicts from potential violence to civilized legal settlements.

7. The Impact of Conflict on the Quality of Democracy and Social Cohesion

Political conflicts in the 2024 elections have a two-way impact. On the one hand, conflicts managed through institutional mechanisms can strengthen democracy. Strict contestation, active supervision, and transparent dispute resolution show that the

democratic system is functional and able to absorb tensions peacefully. In the perspective of Coser (1956), this kind of conflict is functional because it strengthens the rules of the game and correction mechanisms.

On the other hand, unmanaged conflicts have destructive impacts. Identity politics and hardened polarization can damage social cohesion, foster distrust between citizens, and leave social wounds that are difficult to heal after elections. Allegations of fraud that are not satisfactorily resolved can lower public trust in democratic institutions and cause a crisis of legitimacy. Post-election political tensions show that electoral conflicts do not stop on polling day, but continue in the form of contestation of discourse and power relations (Dynamics of Post-Election Political Tensions 2024, 2024).

The impact of conflict is also structural on the quality of democracy. When political participation is driven more by material transactions and emotional mobilization than rational awareness, democracy tends to stop at the procedural level and fail to achieve its substance. The substantive quality of democracy requires citizens who are critical, participatory, and able to manage differences maturely. Therefore, the impact of the 2024 election conflict must be read as an indicator as well as a warning about the condition of the maturity of Indonesia's democracy.

One of the impacts that needs special attention is the potential erosion of public trust in democratic institutions. Trust is a social capital that is the glue of the legitimacy of the

political system. When electoral conflicts are prolonged and their resolution is perceived as unfair, citizens can experience cynicism and political apathy. Widespread apathy is actually dangerous for democracy because it weakens citizens' control over power and opens up space for abuse of authority.

However, the experience of going through electoral conflicts relatively peacefully can also strengthen democratic resilience. The nation's ability to resolve disputes through constitutional channels, accept election results, and resume normal state life is an indicator of democratic maturity. In other words, each election cycle, including the conflicts that accompany it, can be a collective learning space for the nation to gradually improve its democratic governance.

8. Conflict Management and Implications for Civics Education

The above findings point to one important node: political conflicts cannot be eliminated from elections, but can and must be managed. Effective conflict management demands synergy between institutional strengthening, law enforcement, digital space governance, and last but not least, the formation of a mature political culture at the citizen level. This is where civic education (PPKn) occupies a strategic position.

Almond and Verba (1963) emphasized that the stability of democracy is highly dependent on the political culture of its citizens, especially the political culture of the participants who balance active involvement

with the willingness to obey the rules of the game. This kind of political culture is not formed automatically, but through a continuous process of socialization and political education. Civic education plays a role in instilling the values of tolerance, respect for differences, legal awareness, and the ability to think critically in responding to political information.

In the context of the 2024 election conflict, strengthening political literacy and digital literacy through PPKn is an urgent need. Political literacy equips citizens to understand their political rights and obligations rationally, so that they are not easily mobilized by identity politics or money politics. Digital literacy equips citizens to filter information, recognize disinformation, and participate healthily in the digital space. Both are the main bulwarks in transforming the potential for destructive conflict into constructive democratic participation.

Civic education also plays a role in instilling conflict resolution skills from an early age. Through learning that emphasizes dialogue, deliberation, and respect for differences of opinion, students are accustomed to resolving conflicts peacefully and rationally. This skill is the foundation for the formation of citizens who are able to contest without having to be hostile, and disagree without having to break the bond of national brotherhood.

Within the framework of Pancasila values, electoral conflict management finds its philosophical foundation. The values of unity, deliberation for consensus, and social justice

provide guidelines for conflict resolution that prioritizes common interests above the interests of the group. The internalization of these values through PPKn is expected to be able to form a national character that places political differences in the framework of unity as a nation. Thus, PPKn not only functions as a transfer of knowledge, but also as a vehicle for the formation of a mature civic disposition.

Practically, electoral conflict management requires the collaboration of various parties. Election organizers need to strengthen their integrity and neutrality; the government and law enforcement officials need to act decisively against violations; political parties need to carry out the function of political education responsibly; and civil society and educational institutions need to intensify democratic education. With this integrative conflict management framework, elections can return to their nature as a means of peaceful and dignified power circulation.

9. Synthesis: Towards Democratic Governance of Electoral Conflicts

The synthesis of all findings shows that political conflicts in the 2024 elections are not an anomaly, but an integral part of the growing democratic process. The horizontal, vertical, and structural conflicts identified are interrelated and strengthened by accelerators in the form of identity politics, money politics, and digital disinformation. However, the existence of an institutional dispute resolution mechanism shows that Indonesia's democratic system has the capacity to absorb and

transform these conflicts. The problem lies in the extent to which that capacity can continue to be strengthened.

The analytical framework built in this study shows the existence of complex cause-and-effect relationships. Structural factors create conflict-prone conditions; political actors exploit these vulnerabilities through identity and capital mobilization; while the digital space increases the reach and speed of escalation. At the end point, conflict resolution institutions and the maturity of citizens determine whether conflicts will end in destructive or become momentum for strengthening democracy. This series of relationships emphasizes that interventions cannot be carried out at one point, but must be systemic.

Democratic governance of electoral conflicts thus requires a multi-layered approach. At the upstream level, it is necessary to improve regulations and institutional design so that they do not become a source of structural conflict. In the middle layer, it is necessary to strengthen supervision, law enforcement, and digital space governance to limit the space for conflict accelerators. At the downstream level, it is necessary to strengthen dispute resolution institutions and form a mature political culture through education. These three layers must work simultaneously and support each other.

Within this framework, civic education occupies a position as a long-term investment that works at the most basic level, namely the formation of citizens. Although institutional

improvement and law enforcement are important and urgent, the sustainability of democracy ultimately depends on the quality of its citizens. Citizens who are politically literate, critical of information, and uphold national values are the strongest bulwarks in preventing electoral conflicts from developing into violence that undermine the cohesion of the nation.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that political conflict is an inherent phenomenon in the implementation of the 2024 General Election as the most complex simultaneous election in Indonesian history. These conflicts are manifested in three interrelated typologies, namely horizontal conflicts between citizens and supporters triggered by identity politics and polarization; vertical conflicts between participants and organizers related to alleged fraud and dispute over results; and structural conflicts stemming from ambiguities in regulations and institutional design of simultaneous elections.

Money politics, patronage, clientelism, disinformation, and the mobilization of buzzers on social media serve as accelerators that increase the intensity of conflicts. On the other hand, the existence of Bawaslu and the Constitutional Court as dispute resolution institutions, along with the Re-Vote instrument, are institutional channels that are able to reduce the escalation of conflicts towards a peaceful legal settlement, although they still face various limitations.

These findings confirm that political conflicts are not inherently destructive. Referring to the perspective of functional conflict theory, conflicts can be productive for democracy if they are managed through credible institutional mechanisms, and destructive if they are allowed to attack the basic national consensus. Therefore, the quality of democracy is not measured by the absence of conflict, but by the capacity of the political system and the maturity of citizens in managing it.

Theoretically, this study strengthens the relevance of functional conflict theory in analyzing contemporary electoral dynamics, while emphasizing that the perspective of political culture remains important to understand citizens' behavior in the face of contestation. Practically, this study emphasizes the importance of synergy between institutional strengthening, law enforcement, digital space governance, and democratic education as a single conflict management strategy.

Based on these conclusions, this study recommends strengthening civic education as a long-term strategy in electoral conflict management, especially through improving political literacy and digital literacy. The next research is recommended to conduct a more in-depth empirical study on the effectiveness of the 2024 election dispute resolution mechanism, as well as a comparative study of electoral conflicts between regions to enrich

understanding of the dynamics of political conflicts in local and national democracies.

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